Matthew Griffin, described as “The Adviser behind the Advisers” and a “Young Kurzweil,” is the founder and CEO of the 311 Institute, a global futures and deep futures consultancy working between the dates of 2020 to 2070, and is an award winning futurist, and author of “Codex of the Future.” Regularly featured in the global media, including AP, BBC, CNBC, Discovery, RT, and Viacom, Matthew’s ability to identify, track, and explain the impacts of hundreds of revolutionary emerging technologies on global culture, industry and society, is unparalleled. Recognised for the past six years as one of the world’s foremost futurists, innovation and strategy experts Matthew is an international speaker who helps governments, investors, multi-nationals and regulators around the world envision, build and lead an inclusive, sustainable future. A rare talent Matthew’s recent work includes mentoring Lunar XPrize teams, re-envisioning global education and training with the G20, and helping the world’s largest organisations envision and ideate the future of their products and services, industries, and countries. Matthew's clients include three Prime Ministers and several governments, including the G7, Accenture, Bain & Co, BCG, BOA, Blackrock, Bentley, Credit Suisse, Dell EMC, Dentons, Deloitte, Du Pont, E&Y, GEMS, HPE, Huawei, JPMorgan Chase, KPMG, McKinsey, PWC, Qualcomm, SAP, Samsung, Sopra Steria, UBS, and many more.
WHY THIS MATTERS IN BRIEF
In time the cost and ease of modifying any living organisms genome and genetic makeup, for better and worse, will fall to almost zero, and as gene editing tools become democratised and sought after by Bio-Terrorists, researchers are trying to find the technology’s Kryptonite – the technology to stop it in its tracks.
In September 2016, Jennifer Doudna called a new colleague named Kyle Watters to her office. By then, the University of California, Berkeley, biochemist was famous as the co-inventor of CRISPR. The revolutionary invention of the fast and versatile tool to edit genes, and a global game changer, had vaulted her to global notoriety and considerable wealth. She was the founder of several startup companies and had collected millions in science-prize money. But while the powerful tool helped revolutionise how we edit genes, for good, it was also later flagged by the UN as the world’s most powerful bioweapon – a tool that, when combined with something called a Gene Drive could bring about a new arms race where cheap and easy to manufacture genetic weapons, not nuclear ones, became the world’s greatest threat.
Ominously shortly after the discovery, as Doudna has recounted, she was haunted by a dream in which Adolf Hitler appeared, holding a pen and paper, requesting a copy of the CRISPR recipe. What horrible purpose could Hitler have? Doudna, in her retellings of her dream, didn’t say. But now Doudna’s question to Watters was, would he like to work on a way to stop it? Stop CRISPR.
CRISPR is found inside bacteria. It’s a billion year old defense against marauding viruses that spots their DNA and uses a scissors-like protein to chop it up. Doudna played a key role in transforming the find into a revolutionary gene-editing tool that’s been taken up worldwide, propelling a wave of new research and potential cures.
But if scientists learn to deliver gene editors inside people’s bodies, what’s to stop a madman, terrorist, or state from weaponising CRISPR to cause harm? The answer? At the moment it’s “nothing.” Literally. And funnily enough that’s a huge issue with the word huge being a huge understatement.
Experts, myself included, unfortunately are now able to imagine personalized genetic attacks capable of striking at only certain ethnic groups, or, at the other end of the spectrum, the creation of designer soldiers whose genomes are edited to feel no pain. Doudna was well familiar with the dilemma. In her book A Crack in Creation, she wrote that she feared gene editing could come to the world’s attention, as atomic power did, in a mushroom cloud.
“Could I and other concerned scientists save CRISPR from itself … before a cataclysm occurred?” she asked.
Now she would have a chance. Earlier in 2016, the US intelligence agencies had designated gene editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction. That September, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) had jumped in, putting out a call for new ways to control or reverse the effects of gene-editing technology. The program, called Safe Genes, would end up with a budget of more than $65 million, making it one of the largest sources of cash for CRISPR research, aside from biotech startups developing new genetic treatments.
One problem, as DARPA saw it, was the lack of any easy-to-use countermeasure, an “undo button,” or “antidote” for CRISPR. And the more powerful gene editing becomes, the more we might need one – in case of a lab accident, or worse. As UC Berkeley put it in a 2017 press release after Doudna, with Watters’s help, claimed part of the big DARPA contract, the university intended to build tools to counter bioterrorism threats including “weapons employing CRISPR itself.”
CRISPR weapons? I’ll leave it to your imagination exactly what one could look like. What is safe to say, though, is that DARPA has asked Doudna and others to start looking into prophylactic treatments or even pills you could take to stop gene editing, just the way you can swallow antibiotics if you’ve gotten an anthrax letter in the mail. Scientists under Doudna’s project say they are set to begin initial tests on mice to see if the rodents can be made immune to CRISPR editors.
“Can we shut off CRISPR?” asks Joseph S. Schoeniger, who leads one arm of the defense effort at Sandia National Laboratories, in Livermore, California. “That is what we are looking at. The basic concept is that this technology is coming along, [so] wouldn’t it be nice to have an ‘off’ switch.”
By the time Doudna drafted her proposal to DARPA, other scientists already had one big clue for how to stop CRISPR. In the ancient struggle between bacteria and the viruses called phage that infect them, phage had developed their own antidotes to CRISPR. In fact, their genomes, it’s been found, harbour the ability to produce what is essentially “CRISPR kryptonite” – small proteins exquisitely tuned by evolution to disable the gene-editing tool. Scientists call these molecules “Anti-CRISPRs.” The first Anti-CRISPRs were discovered in 2013 by a student at the University of Toronto named Joseph Bondy-Denomy.
“It was serendipity. We stumbled onto the fact that some phages seemed to be resistant to CRISPR. When we put the phage into a cell, the bacteria couldn’t protect itself,” says Bondy-Denomy, now a professor at the University of California, San Francisco. He quickly zeroed in on one of the virus’s 50 or so genes as the reason. “We thought, wow, maybe this is turning off CRISPR.”
The number of labs studying such defenses is smaller than the number working with CRISPR. But anti-CRISPR is becoming a booming field in its own right. More than 40 anti-CRISPR proteins have already been found, many by Doudna’s lab. Other teams are having early success locating conventional chemicals that can inhibit CRISPR as well. Today, Amit Choudhary of Harvard University, in Boston, also with funding from DARPA, reported he had found two drugs that prevent gene-editing when mixed with human cells.
“The hallmark of any powerful technology is control,” says Choudhary. “It’s that simple.”
Researchers like Bondy-Denomy believe anti-CRISPRs could have a role in improving future gene-editing treatments, by giving researchers more precise control. For instance, a team in Germany recently showed if they combined CRISPR and anti-CRISPR, they could create an editor that will change DNA only in liver cells, but not neurons or muscle.
Another application being studied is whether anti-CRISPR could create a safeguard against the aforementioned Gene Drive technology – a technology so powerful it can render entire species, or sub-species, extinct. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is backing the development of a CRISPR tool that will spread though wild mosquitoes, causing their populations to crash, and possibly make the insects extinct, in order to prevent malaria. Meanwhile others want to develop such gene drives in mice, so they can eradicate the invasive rodents from islands without using poison by using a combination of CRISPR and gene drives to make them extinct by “turning off their genetic ability to reproduce.”
But what if these experiments go haywire and lead to a full on species extinction? Researchers think they can create organisms with anti-CRISPR programmed into their genomes so they’re immune. In an initial proof of principle, scientists in Kansas last year engineered yeast cells with anti-CRISPR to resist a gene drive.
“If some North Korean lab comes at you with a gene drive to wipe out an economically important crop, you could have a transgenic crop that [is resistant]. That is the drawing board scenario,” says Erik Sontheimer of the University of Massachusetts Medical School.
The advent of the CRISPR tool starting in mid-2012 surprised scientists. Essentially overnight, ham-fisted ways of genetic engineering were replaced by a cheap, versatile, and programmable means of changing DNA inside any living thing. Forecasters whose job was to anticipate new dangers “totally missed” CRISPR, says Renee Wegrzyn, the biodefense scientist who runs DARPA’s program. The humbling failure to see the future quickly morphed into a “critical urgent issue for national security.”
That’s because researchers, doctors, and startups backed by venture capitalists began a race to learn how to deploy CRISPR inside plants, animals, and humans, using electrical shocks, injections, nanoparticles, viruses, and vaccines. And the better they got at it, the more realistic some sort of novel biothreat could become.
By 2015, Doudna had also started to question how CRISPR was being used in more-routine laboratory research settings. Some of the experiments looked dangerous – what if a graduate student was hurt?
“We are pushing these technologies out into the world, and we are not accompanying them with the safety measures that should be in place,” Wegrzyn told a gathering of the Long Now Foundation, in 2017, in San Francisco. “I really started to feel this sense of urgency that someone needed to do something about this.”
In her talk, Wegrzyn said the danger of CRISPR was obvious from how scientists were already using gene-editing to make mice sick by snipping important genes. “I don’t think you need to be a biosecurity expert to recognize that there is a need for scrutiny when you look at a tool that can both cure and cause disease,” she told the California gathering. “If we need to shut down a gene editor immediately, we just don’t know how to do this.”
There’s still no agreement about how dangerous CRISPR could be in the wrong hands. “Red team” exercises sponsored by the CIA over the summer of 2016, where a group of analysts called the Jasons were asked to dream up their worst ideas, didn’t settle the question. Later, the National Academies of Sciences, at the request of the US Department of Defense, produced an entie ranking of possible threats from synthetic biology, putting CRISPR weapons toward the middle of the pack. But the military said it saw no imminent danger to soldiers.
Doudna agrees that CRISPR’s dangers should not be overblown.
“I get these questions a lot about CRISPR systems and nefarious uses, and my feeling is that I am no more or less worried about CRISPR than other things. Someone could synthesize the smallpox virus using it,” she says – something that one American university got very close to when they re-created the extinct Horsepox Virus using the technology.
Similarly, while her research may lead to an eventual gene-editing antidote, her lab’s work with anti-CRISPRs is mainly addressing fundamental biological questions.
“I am still at step one,” she says. “How do these work?”
Others, though, worry the risks are already apparent and that antidotes can’t come soon enough. For instance, some scientists have sought to prevent public discussion of specific CRISPR studies, or even delete mention of them from the internet, presumably to allow scientists more time to develop countermeasures.
“The general prevailing attitude is not to give people nightmare fuel while we are actively looking for answers. There’s always a concern about an early freak-out,” says Doudna’s former collaborator Watters, who in 2018 authored a review of gene editing’s implications for biosecurity.